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Appraising Nigeria's Tax Effort: A Comparative
Econometric Analysis
Peter D. Golit*
The paper emptoys the conoentional modet of tax effort to oPPraise-Niryna; t1x P?[o'-on:.i"
,o.foiro, to' otiur counties of the West African Monetary Zone.(VVAMZ). The key objecttue of the
stuity is to rtetermine whethn Nigeia is linited it its reoenue collectionsby almo caPality to gryerat:-ta:
rn/nue o, by nan-comnihnent-towards using the aoailable tax caPacity to fund public sert:ice1'.1! the
country has"the capacity to in$ease tax reoenTe, what are the aryroPiate channels through which _tax
ctn be inireasid? Empiical aidetce suggests that Nigeia is not making the optimal ux of her
and its
taxable capacity as the country's potentint for hi[her tax rnenue exceeds actual tax collection,
tax retmue. The paper ancluiles that the country is
ffirt is least aiong theWAiZ counties in raising
iot constrained inits reomue collections by a tou iapacity to genelate tar reamue arul could, in the amt
whm key sectors
of a budgetary imbalance, choose to raise exlra reumue rather than rationing ocPenditute

rami

or" yrrmingfor greater

i1th,

The

fndings fu.rther ranal that income andproft taxes

fnancing.
*ott"oppropriate iianiels thiough which Nigeia can improoe tax pefitmance giom the low
iri tt "i*oiy
be

inat* "oy to* ,yyit iW country is makingln these areai. The willingn*s to nade taxes is also found to
of the study,
assoAiea wi* taxpryer{ zial to operite in tlu sh.adow economy. Tlrc major,contribution

tierifuie, ties in iti ofrlity to prrrii, t,npiical su*ort .in identifuing the nght channds thro.ugh which
iilirio io" i*pr*e taximmue. The study recommends ihe implem.entation of deliberate policies aimed,
,tTrir,arg th" scope of the underground eionomy to ctrtail tax eoasion, broadm the income tax base and
tax increase
enhance tix colleckoi. The otttcomes also ditsut[e furlhcr possibilities t'or non-distottionary
undet

i

irect tamtion.

JELClassilication Numbers: H20,E6Z
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I.

Introduction
here is a growing recognition among developing countries of the
crucial role-of taxalion as an instrument of economic development' Tax
revenues are increasingly accounting for larger proportion of total
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world-c( ntries are intensi$ing efforts at designing tax
systems that are capable of gr nerating sufficient revenue to financJ the
required level ofpublic expenditure. However, these countries face numerous
challenges in their attempts to institute an efficient and effective tu* .y.t.*.
This is partly because the structure of most deveroping countries -is not
amenable to certain taxes. It is difficult to impose and coflecitaxes from
certain
sectors of.the economy. T^anzi
Zee (2000) observed that developing
-and
countries like Nigeria are often characterized
by a large share ofagricultuie
total output and employment; large informal r"ito. u"iiriti"s and
o'ccupations;
many small establishments; a small share of wages in national incomeia
smali
share of total consumer spending made in rarge, modem establis'hments,
among others. All these characteristics, they argued, reduce the possibility
oi
relying on certain modem taxes, such as persoial income tax and, to a reiser
extent, value added tax. They also have the potential to reduce the achievement
ofhigh tax levels.
revenue and most third

ii

The stnrcture of these economies combined with low riteracy and
low human
capital undermine any serious efforts at putting in place u gooJ iu*
,
administration. when the staffofthe tax administrati6n is poorly eduiated
and

not well trained, when wages and necessary equipments are inadequate,
when
tax payers are constrained by ability to keep records, when telecommunication
facilities are insufficient, particulaily in rural areas where u lurg..
ofthe population is based and when postal services are unreliabtJand
in certain
cases non-existent, it is diffrcult to institute an efficient tax
system and an
effective and effrcient tax administration. Consequently, a.r"toping
tend.to develop tax systems that allow them io exiioit wrrutev"e. op,ion.
possible rather than develop modem and efficient tax systems.

p;;;;;i;;
.o;;ri;

More over, the political situation in most deveroping countries is such that
economic and political power are concentrated utihJtop with the rich
elitist

class able to prevent tax reforms that could adversely affect them.
For this anJ
some other reasons, personal income taxes are armlst exclusivety
apptieJio
wage income in the formal sector (specifically government employmenQ

that
accounts for an insignificant proportion of'the working popuruiion,
paltry sums are collected as property tax from the rich, n,ulingih"
tu* .yr,.*.

*tii.
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barely progressive. An important inference that can be drawn from the above
assessment is that the formulation of tax policies in developing countries
hardly aims at optimal taxation but the pursuit of what is possible. Tax
revenues, therefore, remain low giving room for large fiscal deficits. In
Nigeria, for instance, the Federal Govemment overall deficit stood at N301.4
billion in 2002. It later declined to N202.7 billion, NI72.6 billion, Nl61'4
bitlionandNl0l.3 billion in2003,2004,2005 and 2006, respectively, (Central
Bank ofNigeria,2006).
Since income taxes are limited by structural and administrative constraints, the
Nigerian tax system relies heavily on a small number of tax sources,
spJcifically international trade taxes that are rulnerable to external shocks, and
this remains a serious problem in the tax system. Apart from a dodgy culture of
tax evasion, the perceived over-dependence on intemational trade taxes puts a
question mark on the country's tax effort and its capability to raise suffrcient

tax revenue under the present disproportionate tax structure. The resultant
budget deficits, in addition to the inefficient use of public expenditures, have
continued to constrain investments in human capital and physical
infrastructure, thus slowing the level of economic growth and development.

Given the above limitations, the focus of fiscal policy will be to raise more
revenue to emerge from the fiscal imbalance and generate sufficient
investment in key sectors to better the life of the people. What becomes
relevant, therefore, is the important question ofwhether or not the country has
the capacity to collect a larger share of national income to finance its
development objectives. In other words, does Nigeria's 'capacity'to tax exceed
the 'effort' the country is currently making to tax that capacity?

To address the above concems, the study seeks to examine Nigeria's tax
performance in terms of her'tax effort' through an inter-country comparison
with other countries of the West-African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)' The main
objective of the tax perfornance analysis is to investigate Nigeria's tax 9ffo!
ani determine the possibitity or otherwise of increasing tax revenue if. it is
found that the country's tax effort is not optimal. Ifpossibilities exist, which are
the appropriate tax components through which tax revenue can be increased?
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An index of 'tax effort'which is a measure oftax performance will afford us the
oppoffunity to answer these questions.

The significance of the inter-country comparisons of tax effort is to reveal
whether Nigeria is limited in its revenue collections by low .upu"ity -io
generate tax revenues or by non-commitment towards using the
uruilubl" tu*
capacity to fund public services. If Nigeria, under a budg;ary imbalance, is
already making the optimal use of her tixable capacity, thii would suggest
tilai
adjustment to a budget balance woultr require expentliture rationing ratier
than

raising taxes.

Rakhe (2003) noted that the presence of tax leakage destroys the primary
condition for achieving fiscal sustainability. And sinc*e the n."rr n"urti
oiuny
economy is a function of its fi-scal sustainability, a detailed analysis
of tai
performance through the tax effort index may alsb be useful in
understandin!
the probable causes and solutions offiscal criiis in any given country.
It
important for a countr5r to ascertain its taxabre .upu"it! in o.d". to fo.,,,riui.
tax policies that will enhance revenue collection withoui necessarily
inhibiting
aggregate production and consumption in the country. To determine
the tai
to
be
targeted
for
improvement
in
tax revenue is tantamount to
:?*:.^r.
identiffing where policy and poticy implementation as regards taxation
is
effective or not. The above points, tirerefire, underscore the-relevance
of the
study.to the overall tax policy formulation and implementution p.*".r
in
Nigeria.

is;[;

The paper is stnrctured into six sections, with this introduction
as section one.
Section two discusses the theoretical issues and reviews previous
empirical

'*oJ"i
work_on
.this topic. In section three, the methodology ir"fuJi,
specification and the earlier approaches used to explore th-e determinaits
oftax
effort are discussed. Section four provides a deicriptive analysis
th. i;;
revenue performance in Nigeria relative to other wA-MZ
.ornti... "f
In section
five, we present and analyze the empirical results on the determinants
ofthe tax
ratio. The estimated tax effort indiies are also presented and discussed
in this
section. Section six provides the conclusion oft-he paper.
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Literature Review

The role of taxation as an instrument of economic development cannot be over-

emphasized. Tax revenues have become the most important source of
govemment revenue in most developed and developing countries. The primary
objective offiscal policy in most developing countries is, therefore, the need to
raise more revenue through adjustments in tax policies. Tax authorities are,
thus, becoming more concerned with the design of equitable and efficient tax
systems that are capable of financing the necessary level of govemment
expenditure and, thus, limit recourse to public borrowing' The revenue must
also be raised in ways that minimize any disincentive effects on economic
activities and must not deviate substantially from international best practices.
Heady (2002) demonstrated how some Organization for Economic
Coopiration and Development (OECD) countries including Korea and the
United Kingdom raised considerable revenues from property taxes.
Concems over the low tax effort in developing countries goaded Nicholas
Kaldor (1963) to ask "will underdeveloped countries learn to tax?" Bird,
Vazquez and Torgler (2007) noted that the underlying assumption ofKaldor's
question is that a country wishing to develop needs to collect in taxes an
amount greater than the l0-15 per cent found in many developing countries.
And foi these countries to meet the global aspiration of attaining the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) come 2015, they must spend more
on economic and soiial infrastructures, which can only be achieved through
improvement in tax efforts to realize the required level ofpublic expenditure.
The concept of tax effort' as given by Chelliah, Baas and Kelly ( 1975) refel t9
the ratio oi actual tax yield to the yield of a representative tax system. A high
value of the tax effort index indicates that a particular country is collecting

more tax than would be predicted, given its tax structure and prevailing
economic and social conditions. The tax effort index, thus, reflects the extent to
which

a

country makes use of its taxable capacity (Goode, 1984)'

defned tat elftrt as the aariance in tlu taxable capacity of a giaen country, and,
the predicted
lnc tax enot inaex yor anyiuntry is'usually measured by the ratio-of the.actual ttx ratio to

,

piancastelli (2001)

also

of a representatioe
ratio. tiie mncept if taxible capacity, on thc other hand, refers to the ratio of the yield
tax systen to GrossNational Product (GNP) .
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The tax effort indices, unlike simple tax ratio comparisons, enable the
evaluation ofthe effectiveness ofa particular country in riising tax revenue, as
it makes provision for differences among countries to raise tixes. The above
approach refers to what Chelliah (1971) termed a "static" measure of tax
performance since it measures tax potential at a given point in time. Tax
efforts
should, however, be considered in a dynamic sinse so that ifa country has a
low_tax effort at a particularpoint in time, one may be able to tell whether it has
made efforts over a time period to increase tax revenues. This consequently
necessitates the need to compare income elasticity of total taxes. the incoml
buoyancy'oftax revenue provides information on the past efforts to increase
tax revenue. As a result, tax performance in developing countries can be
assessed in terms ofindices oftax effort in the static sense or on the basis
ofthe
income elasticity oftotal tax revenue, depending on the purpose of the stuJy.
chelliah stared that ifthe purpose ofthe study we-re to understand the potentiil
for tax increases in a given country through iomparisons with other cLuntries,
then the appropriate approach would be to use the static index oftax
effort ani
the actual tax ratio. If, on the other hand, the purpose were to assess
the tax
performance ofa country as part ofthe overall diveiopment performance
in the
context of, say, considering_the eligibility for further iid, it would be necessary
to take into account both the static and dynamic indices. rn which
case, if a
count4r has an above average ta.x
index (static) and also a high erasiicity
coefticient, its tax performance is 9[91
highly evaluated (Teera, 2003). Pioneer works in the literature on tax effort include those of Musgrave
(1969),
Lotz and Morss (1970), Chelliah, Baas and Kelly (1975) and Ta-it, Grit
ani
Eichcngreen ( I 979) which captured developmenis during the t soos
to the late
1970s. Musgrave (1969) opined that the iax performaice
of a developing
country can be measured in.four major ways among which are ,the abiliiy
give up approach'; the ,efficient.esou."" use approich'; the
approach' and the 'comparison with average performance appioach'
also
known as the stochastic approach. He suggeited that instead

tI
ability;.;li";;
"i'rr.rrr.irg "

zA.ccording

to Daooorti aad

Grigoian (2007), tar reoelue buoyancy relers to th? elssticity oI tax rel,mues
The erastia.ty summanzes the i'npait oiioth tax poriry
@isi ,x"" .iri ,)

ui th reswct to nominar cD p.

unclnnged tax nd.ministration)

as

we\

as

tat administration lwith an'unchangerd

t* piti"yf'

'

'

'
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country's perfornance against absolute standards, it may be more appropriate
to evaluate a country's fiscal performance by comparing its overall tax level to
the average tax burden ofa group of representative countries considered to be
similar in certain respects. This approach is regarded as the most effective and,
thus, the most commonly used approach (Teera, 2003)' The effort or
performance of a country can be measured in terms of how closely a computed
indicator of performance approaches the average record. Lotz and Morss
(1970) pioneered the application of the gap between actual and potential tax
ratios for inter-country comparison oftax efforts.
Several explanatory variables have also been used by eminent scholars,to
attempt arr empirical measurement of tax efforts in various countries. The
variables used in the literature include share of agricultural output in GDP, per
capita income, share of mineral exports in GDB the degree of opennessof the
economy, the ratio ofmoney to GDP and a host of other variables depending on
the charicteristics common to the specific gtoup of countries. Chelliah, Baas
and Kelly (1975) took a sample of 47 countries and used the mining ratio, the
agricultural share and the export ratio as determinants of tax share in GDP to
for the period 1969-1971' The
-1u.*" tax efforts in deveioping countries
result showed that the agriculture share is negative while the mining share is
positively related to the tax share. The export ratio was not significant'

Tait and Gra,u (1979) later updated the work of Chelliah, Baas and Kelly
(1975) using the same sample of developing countries for the period 1972ieZO. tt .y, ttowever, did not find the share ofagriculture to be significant but
their measure oftax effort indices produced similar results to the initial study.
Stotsky and woldeMariam (1997) used panel data on 43 Sub-SaharanAfrican
co,rnt i"r during the period 1990-1995 to measufe the determinants ofthe tax
share in GDp;d to construct an index of tax effort for these countries. The
analysis suggested that the countries with a relatively high tax share tended to
have a relatively high index of tax effort, although these results were not
uniform across the countries. More over, the results indicated that the
determinants of tax share in GDP were the share of agriculture and the share of
mining. These variables were negative and significant. Other variables found
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to be significant were the-share of exports and in some specifications, per
capita income or imports, all ofwhich were positively relatedio the tax shaie.
On the average, no strong link between IMF (Fund) programs and tax
shares was found. The inclusion of Fund programmes was based
on the

.

expectation that MF-supported programmeJ i, Sub-Saharan African
countries may involve measures to raise tax revenues and to restrucfure tax
systems in these countries. Also, country-specific factors appeared
to be
important determinants of the tax share. while some of the countries
had
substantially increased their tax effort over the years, others experienced
marked declines.

In

study, Eltony (2002) used time-series and cross-sectional country
data for the period 1994-2000 for 16 Arab countries to examine thl
determinants of tax effort. The results suggested that the main determinants
of
tax revenue share in GDp were per capita income, the share
of agricutture ana
the share of mining in GDp. othei variabler ihut *"." alsJ found
to be
important include the share of exports, imports and the outstanding
r"i.ig,
debts. Furthermore, country-specific factors such as tt e poriticai
syste-ii,
attitudes toward governrnent, the quality of tax adrni,istiation and
othel
institutions of government appeared to be important determinants
of tax share.
The results for the tax effort index showed ihat for Arab countries
that were
facing budget deficits, especialry those of the Gulf cooperation
coun.rl
(GCC), there was room to increaie their tax revenues by reforming
thei;
ano^ther

systems.

i;;

A more recent study by Teera (2003) attempted an assessment
of uganda's tax
performance relative to l 8 other Sub-Saharan African countries
aimed at
feasibiliry of raising tax revenues in Uganda. An
i]1l1,i1q,,|l"
teatur-e of this study is that it not only used pooled data
to construct an index of
tax effort for these countries, but the model was appried to individual
tax shares
to pinpoint the source ofthe high and low tax e#ort. The
result showed that
Uganda's tax effort index for total taxes and taxes on income
were below unity,
while the indices for intemational trade taxes and taxes on goods
and services
were above unity. The overall tax effort index indicateJ
that uganda haJ

il;o;;;
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exploited its estimated tax potential less than ayerage and, hence, the
possibility existed for her to increase tax revenue. The recent improvement in
the contribution of tax revenue to her total revenue implied that something was
being done in that direction.

Bird, Vazquez and Torgler (2007) dwelt extensively on the relevance of
demand factors such as comrption, voice and accountability, and indicated that
not only supply factors matter, but that demand factors common to all countries
also matter quite significantly in the determination of tax effort. The
fundamental conclusion of the paperwas that a more legitimate and responsive
state is likely an essential precondition for a more adequate level oftax effort in

developing countries. To fully understand the performance of any country
therefore, one needs to pay close attention to the factors particular to that
country. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) also found empirical support for the
relevance of demand factors and argued that the quality of institutions and
govemance influence tax revenue through their contribution to tax evasion,
improper tax exemptions andweak tax administration.
The findings by Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) also upheld the above opinions
in their examination of the econometric determinants of Armenia's tax
revenues using a panel data of 141 countries over the 1990-2004 time period.
They found empirical evidence in support of the hlpothesis that the
persistence ofArmenia's low tax-GDP ratio can be traced to the persistence of
weak institutions and a large shadow economy.

Above all, the Nigerian experience demonstrates the relevance of the above
propositions given the policy reversal in 2007 that led to the suspension oftax
waivers by the federal government. The cancellation of the waivers was
attributed to certain abuse ofprivileges that were granted for export promotion
and the attendant adverse effects on tax revenue.

III.

Methodology

Simple tax ratios were used in the past to provide a rough index upon which
comparisons of a country's tax performance were made in relation to other
countries. This approach assumes that the tax base (GDP or national income)

78

Central Bank of Nigeria

Eeoronic

an

urcial Boiea

I{arch 2008

often used is

a proper measure of taxable capac y. However, a simple base as
GDP is not a sufficient measure of taxable c. Jacity, since not all taxes are
explicitly linked to income, its distribution, and now it is earned.

Recent approaches measure taxable capacity by regressing for a sample
of countries the tax-GDP ratio on explanatory variables that serve as proxies
for possible tax bases, inctuding other factors that might affect a country's
ability to raise tax revenue. The approach is operationalized by correlating ihe
ratio of tax revenue to GDP (the dependent variable) for a group of countries
with similar characteristics against several independent variiblei, for the same
countries, that could be expected to influence the tax ratio. when solved with
data for a specific country, the estimated regression equation provides a
hypothetical tax ratio for that country. This tax ratio is then compared with the
countqr's actual tax ratio. The measure oftax effort is then constructed as the

ratio of the actual tax share to the predicted (or potential) tax share. The
comparison between the tax ratio estimated from the equation and the actual
tax_level for the country indicates whether, in comparison with other countries,
and taking into account its own characteristics, the country's tax level is above
or below the expected one (Tan zi and, Zee, 2000).

The predicted tax ratio from such a regression is considered the
appropriate measure oftaxable capacity, while the regression coefficients can
be interpreted as the "average" effective rates on thoie bases (Eltony,2002).
The ratio of the actual to the predicted tax ratios is then computed and ihe resuit
reflects the index of "tax effort" which is a measure of tarperformance. This
approach is often referred to as the behavioural approach, with the tax ratio
regressed on variables that serve as proxies for a country's ..tax handles,,. The
explanatory variables are by implication the major deierminants of taxable
capacity and the functional relationship is given as follows:

Here:

TXG defines tax ratio, and y is a vector oftax handles. Given the parameters of
the independent variables captured by the vector oftax handles, a potential tax
ratio can be predicted for each country and this predicted tax ratio represents

Golit : Appraisiog Nigeria's Tax E,ffort
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the average use of capacity factors. The equation represents the average
relationship between the potential tax ratio and the explanatory variables and
this predicted tax ratio estimates the ratio a country would have if it had made
the average tax effort.

It is important to emphasize here that the derived ratio must not be interpreted
to indicate the optimal tax burden for any given country but is useful in
providing a justification to increase a country's tax burden by establishing a
benchmark by which the country's tax level could be judged against the
average of its peers and in anticipating the likely future developments as its
economy becomes more advanced. Determining the optimal tax level will
conceptually amount to determining the optimal level of govemment
expenditure which is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the results will
indicate the extent to which countries make use of their potential tax bases to
raise revenue and suggest whether or not the possibility exists for a country to
increase its tax burden. They also provide guidance on the proper mix offiscal
policy in the event ofbudgetary imbalance (Stotsky and WoldeMariam' 1997).
The study uses regression analysis to measure the determinants of tax
effort in Nigeria relative to other WAMZ countries. It employs pooled time
series and cross sectional country data for the five WAMZ countries for the
period 1992-2005 and, thus, has the advantage ofusing explanatory.variables
ihat vary by both unit of observation (the country) and time. One important
benefit of using such an approach is that the countries chosen tend to have
certain characteristics in common including political and economic
similarities. The need to obtain a data set where the variables can be measured
in a relatively accurate, reliable and consistent manner motivated the choice of
period and ihe countries. The secondary data used were sourced from the
World Bank - African Development Indicators (2005) and the African
Development Bank - Selected Economic Indicators (2006).

III.1

TheModel

The formulation of the tax effort model follows from the conceptual
framework provided in the preceding sections. The approach includes the

specification of an error component model, which allows for separate country
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intercepts and estimated using the pooled time series and cross-country data.
This model is referred to as the fixed-effect moder. The choice of the fixedeffect model is based on our interest in making inferences conditional on the
effects that are in the sample (Hsiao, 1986; Greene , 1993; Baltagi, 1996 and
Eltony' 2002). In other words, we are concerned with wAMZ couniries and our
inference is limited to the behaviour ofthese WAMZ countries.
In this study, therefore, we specifu the following tax effort model:

TXG

:

f [TXG (_l ), XMG, MFG, AGG, FDG,

yR SV]............(2)

From equation (2), the variables expected to influence the tax share in
GDp
(TXG),. include
lagged
values
of
the tax ratio, the share of
.one-period
intemational trade in GDP (xMG), the share of the manufacturing sector
(MFG),..the size of agriculture in the economy (AGG), share 6f total
oxtsraldilg foreign debt (FDG), share of p".
income (yp) and the
"upitu
shadow variable (SV) proxying the size of the-hidden
<o. una..grou"aj
economy. The linear specification of the tax effort function can b"
exiress"i

thus:

TXG,,=a.,+ B,TXGi,

(-l)+ p,XMGi+ BrMFGr,+

B6YPi,+p?SVi

B.AGGi,+ p5FDG,, +

+p,....................

..............(3)

Here: p is the error term, i denotes the country, and t denotes time.

Using E-Views, we carried out a logarithmic transformation of equation (3)
and expressed it as an Autoregresiive Distributed Lag Model
enii
io.
'variabres"
Model),
.with lags of both the dependent and exf,lanatory
considering the number of included o6servations, it wai deemed feasible
to
include lags ofup to two periods on the explanatory variabres. The incrusion
of
the lagged regressors was basedon our suspicion about the results
obtaineJby
some previous studies on developing countries which found that import#
variables like the shares ofagriculture and manufacturing we." insig"ifi'.anii;
determining the tax ratio. we belief that some of the outcomes must have
resulted from inertia of the dependent variable, whereby
i" irr"

"rru"g"r
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explanatory variables do not immediately affect the dependent variable. In
other words, changes in the tax ratio may not necessarily be due to changes.in
the contemporan;ous values of the explanatory variables, but may be
attributed to some delayed effects of their past changes or both. It is, therefore,
important to include ali the relevant variables to avoid the problem of "omitted
variable bias". In addition, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is
also justified on the grounds that there is an adjustment process in the. decision
to piy taxes. In essence, tax payers take time to adjust their behaviour' We'
thereiore, estimated the AROi tttodel for both the total tax ratio and the ratios
of the individual tax components and applied the empirical results separately
on the specific country data to construct the tax effort indices for the individual
i.r. The empirical results and the tax effort indices are presented and
"o.rnt
discussed in section frve.

III.2 ChoiceofVariables
An appropriate specification of a tax effort model requires judgment in
A."iJirig *tricn fo.mutation presents the best combination of economic
."uronlig and statistical merit (Teera, 2003). This judgment must take
in
cognirun"c" of the stage of development and structure of the economy
.nould ali take into consideration traditions and relevant special
quErii*

""4 (Chelliah, 1971). The selection of the independent variables for
Jir.rr-rtan.es

theiefore, reiies on this theoretical foundation, thus, necessitating
-.J.f,
"*
ihe irrclurion of the following explanatory factors earlier specified in the
model.

of tax
The total tax revenue in a given period influences the future collections
previous
revenue for a given countr{. The-higher the tax revenue realized in the
pl.iod, th" grJuter the opptrtunitiei opened in the_current period to finance the
to improvements in
iio""."rn"n'a of ,up"rio. equipments-, in. addition
personnel and the tax administration/collection machinery all
,"
equal. Thus, the larger the previous level of tax revenue' the
tfriogt U.i"g "x
g."":,..it .i"*es for improvements in tax collections in the current period.
"
openness
The share of intemational trade in GDP is a measure of the degreeof
of an economy to extemal influences. Intemational trade has features that

i...r,ir..
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make it more suitable to taxation than domestic trade
and the sectorremains the
most monetized in developing.co.nrries. virtuauy alr activities
exports) take place in specified locations. Trade taies
are, th"."ro.", ui*ngir,"
most.attractive to developing countries because of the
administrative easeilriih
wnlcn they can be couected. Thus, the rerative size of the
extemal sector has

(i*p;;

the potential to raise

tl".

t1*. base

of

"J

developing countries given the

inadequacies associated with their tax administratiins
and the positiv.
that capital flows can make, via overseas trading.

"ff";;;

The

sectoral composition of value_added has important influences
rL_^
rne .ux ratlo srnce certain sectors

on
of the economy are more amenabre to taxation
and generate more taxable surpluses. tn ttre WaUi
countries, th.

.;;.

;i
agriculture in the economy may be an importani determinant
tr*"ti.
capacity given that small farmers are noioriously
difficult ,""r,u* urJ
r,:1.]..,^.-:^.:,iry:"trure (widely practiced in thes. countt.g
ao", not g.n.*i.
large Exable surpluses. Many countries are also
unwilling to tax tf,e main
foods used for subsistence (Stotsky and woldeMariu.,
r esiy. rr,"."ro.e, trr.
Iarger the size of the asriculturar sictor, the r-ui;;;h.
tax revenue may be in
WAMZcountries.
The share of manufachring may also influence the
tax ratio since
-us
manufacturing enterprises are essintiaily easier to
tax than ugt.urtu.e
normally keep records using superior accountiig practices,
::fl.1y,:^y:-1sng can generate
anofianuractufl
large-taxable surpluses, providedlioduction
is eflicient. The share of outstandin! ro..ign
a.ui*uy also influence taxable
capacity since, in attempting ro meer debt se.vice
oUtigati;;;,-;;;;
developing economies loose substantiar .eso,rrces-ihat
courd have aided the
growth of vital sectors of the economy to generate
higher income iht, ;;
obviously a constraining factor and may .ontfiori"ln
.ul*irg ar"i"- u"..
debtor countries.
""r

An important factor frequently used to assess the overall
level of
development in an economy is per capita in.o-".
f"..upita income provides
signals on the level of income ivailabte for taxation.
Tfrrr, tt.
. -^
capita income, the brighter the prospects for imposing
and colle"tir[

-

fri!-t.Iil;;;
tu*"r.
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Another important factor that has negative effects on tax revenue and the entire
tix system is tax evasionr. When taxes are evaded, the consequence will be for
tax revenues to fall below their potentials. The above concern underscores the
rising attention paid to the informal sector in developing countries. The size of
the hidden economy is, therefore, inversely related to the tax ratio. Information
abounds in the literature on the extent of loss oftax revenue arising from tax
evasion and other forms oftax leakage. Feige ( 1981 ) estimated the tax revenue
loss in the United Kingdom (UK) to around [9 million. The estimate by Pyle
( 1 989) also in the UK ranged from €2-f I 1 billion per year. Pyle also rep9191
the loss of revenue due to evasion of value-added tax to lie between f,250
million and €500 million per year. According to Teera (2003), estimates have
been done in other countries and the figures are still large. Thus, the shadow
variable used as proxy for tax evasion is inversely related to the tax ratio'

fV.

Tax Revenue in Nigeria Compared With Other WAMZ Countries

There are considerable variations in tax revenue performance across WAMZ
countries. In the five WAMZ countries for which we were able to source for
reliable data, the share oftax revenue in GDPwas on the average about 13.6 per
cent in 1992 (see Table I below). Among these countries, only Gambia had its
share of tax revenue above 25 per cent in1992. Three of the countries, Ghana,
sierra Leone and Guinea had their share of tax revenue between l0 and 14.9
per cent, but Nigeria had a tax revenue share of only 3 per cent'

putposeful refusal to fulflt tax obligations' Tlrc.eaentual loss in tax reoenue nay
Tax soasion,
dqres,s the fsial position if go,emment ani reduce the ability to prnide essmtial sentices.
imperfectof
the
take
afu)antage
to
in
an
attempt
by
totpayers
thierefore, ah,*sfrom willt'ui ilisrepresentation
differentiated
bc
and
can
hardly
similarities
itrong
has
Tat
nasion
infoimqtion
about tllrir iax liabitities.
'ftoi
tt, howner, difers in being unlm:fuI and, thus, punishabb.Indittiduals aooid taxes by
t*
'stirctaing trunsactions to redice or miniiize ta.a liabilities in a uay thqt noy be unintended by tax
ta,. compliance.
legislators"but permissible by law. Read Franzoni (1998)for details on tax eoasion and

'Tqr euasion refers to

oitii*,.

a
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Tax Revenue (in percentage of GDp)

1992

t993

1994

r995

1996

1v)7

1998

,999

2000

2001

2002

2003

200.1

2$S

Gambi.

25_4

24_9

22_9

t9_4

19.9

18.2

18.5

t6_9

18.2

14.8

17.9

r9

8

20.0

19.2

19.7

Ghm2

10.2

ti.2

t9_2

17.3

17 _3

15.8

t7.7

16.3

18.2

23.E

20_2

2D_3

21.9

20.4

18.0

1.1.9

13.8

12_9

14.1

t2_5

13.6

13_2

12.3

l l.0

12_t)

12.5

t2_2

12.2

16.3

1i.2

Nigeria

3.0

4_2

4.i

3.9

3.3

5.5

9.4

9.5

13.9

15.7

14.6

12_5

10_9

8.9

8.5

s/Lconc

14.5

14.7

13.7

12_1

10.9

5.2

8.9

11_5

17.8

18.1

19.i

20.5

20.8

21.1

15.0

14.1

14.6

13.4

12.8

11.1

8.5

13.3

1S.8

17.0

17.0

17.1

11.7

11.2

14.9

Thc

13.6

Source: A.uthors computation based on data obtained
from:

ye ltic.a:lD?etopmet

Bank (ADB): Selectetl Statistics
TheWorld Bank: African Dnelopntent lndicators 2005

ll
2)

on

Afican Counties 2006

Figure below gives a graphic presentation of the WAMZ countries'
average
^l
tax performance
over the 1992-zoo5 time period. The figure indicates that ili
the other countries recorded an average tai revenue shaie above
r:
except Nigeria which recorded only g.5 per cent over the p".ioa,purnirg
nearly one and a halfdecade.

p*..ri,

wuwzCounrries: Average Tax *:i*1".1" percentage of cDp (1992-2005)
'18.0
1

15.0
13.2

1

1

(%

of GDP)

1

8.5

1

Nigeria
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The trends in tax revenue are not uniform across the WAMZ countries. While
some counffies have recorded sustained increases in tax revenue shares in
recent years, others have witnessed marked declines with their tax shares
shrinking. Recent evidence, howeveq suggests that tax revenue shares are
beginning to strengthen in WAMZ countries. In 2005, the share of tax revenue
in GDP was on the average abottt 17 .2 per cent, representing a 3.6 percentage
point increase over the level in 1992 (see Table 1 above). In comparison, while
the tu* revenue shares for The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone
increased by 1.0,2.2,5.3 and 3.3 percentage points between 2000 and 2005
respectively, the tax revenue share for Nigeria acrually declined by 5.0
perientage points over the same period. While none of the WAMZ countries'
iue.ug. performance stood below 10 per cent from 1992 to 1996, Nigeria
could noi go above 4.3 per cent over the same period. In fact, for the first eight
years, the ;atio was below l0 per cent. It performed above the single digit mark
in only five years.

The above performance of WAMZ counffies when compared with global
efforts remains unimpressive. For instance, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2000) gave the share of tax revenue
for OECD counkies at about 38 per cent on the average in 1999, or 28 per cent
without social security taxes, though wide variations were noticeable, with the
share of tax revenue;anging from 29 per cent in Australia to 51 per cent in
Sweden.

The relatively weak performance of tax revenue in wAMZ countries can be
attributed to severai factors. The reasons, however, vary with peculiar
economic and political characteristics. Some of the WAMZ countries have had
repeated domeitic crises such as civil wars that disrupted revenue collections.
Apart from structural problems, intemational trade taxes are subject to extemal
influences while excliange rate misalignments affect domestic incentives for
production. Income taxis are mostly tied to the formal sector, with high
marginal tax rates and narrow tax bases. Multinational corporations often pay a
dispioportionate share of income taxes compared to local businesses. Personal
income taxes are almost exclusively applied to wage income, particularly
govemment employment, while cases of tax evasion remain prevalent' As

86

Central Bank

of Nigeria

F,nnottic aru! Financia/

Rcuien,

Nlarch 200g

observed by Eltony (2002), tax and customs administrations are weak and
associated with inadequately trained and poorly remunerated personnel,
thus,
unde-rmining the efforts at raising tax revinue. There are also ihe proute'''s
oi
insuffrcient equipment, poor supervision, and weak legal and institutionai
frameworks, which encourage fraudulent practices.

In spite of the above constraints, Ghana and sierra Leone have made
significant progress in improving their tax systems and were able to raise
their
tax revenue shares to over 20 per cent ofGDp in 2005 (see Table 1).

V.

Presentation of Empirical Results
The pooled least squares method was used to estimate the tax
effort model of
equation (3) for the perrod 1992-2005 for total taxes and the individual
tax
components by first taking a rogarithmic expression of all the
variables and
aeating the
specific
effects
as
fixed
using
the
_country
fixed_effect, iriit.
Thereafter, the l.east squares dummy variable (LSD-M) opproori
*uror.Jio
determine the significance or otherwise of the country specific
factors on the
total tax ratio. The sample includes the five wAMz countries and
the tax
components considered in the analysis include taxes on income
and profit
(TYP)' taxes on international trade and transactions (INT) and
Indirect taxes
G.'{DTI. Five separate estimations of the tax effort'model were carried out
using E-Vews. The fixed effects. estimations produceA ,"pu.ut.
y
intercepts and the results were.applied independentry on the
"ou"t
di'fferent."*lri,
data to conskuct tax efforr indicei for the individuaicountries.
we wil uetri
the discussion ofour findings with the results ofthe fixed
effects estimations]

V.l

Fixed-EffectsEstimations

The estimation result of the tax effort model for total taxes is presented
in
Appendix (I). For ease ofanalysis, the results are re-presented in
equation (4)
as follows:
TXG=q*

+ 0.643TXG (-

I)

(8.8e7)

+ 0.3,|4XMG + O.275MFc

-0.47EAGG(-l

O.807FDG (-2)_0.464Sv(_2

)_
)....(4)
.
(3.0e7) (2.2s2) (-2.344)
c5.120) 1-:.:eiy

.
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S.E.R.:0.144

F

:

qqS, R-squared

o,* represents country intercepts. (t-statistics are reported in parentheses)

From the results above, changes in current values of the total tax ratio are
significantly influenced by their past values' The coefltcient ofthe laggeddJpendent variable is one of the most significant explanatory variables (see
Appendix I). The positive coefficient is consistent with apriori expectation'
imptying that the higher the level of tax revenue in the previous period, the
gr.ui".
tt . opportunities tbr instituting a more ef1-ective tax system in the
-urrent
period. This may be achieved through the provision of better
equipments, adequate training of personnel and better remunerations.

The share of intemational trade, like the lagged value of the dependent
variable, conforms wilh apriori expectation as the coefficient is significant at
the 17o level and positively signed. This implies that higher shares of foreign
fiade in GDP ian trigger significant increases in the tax ratio' The
manufacturing share is ilio significant atthe 5Yo level and correctly signed.
This atso agrles with our initial expectation given that enterprises keep
superior accounting records and are easier to tax. Manufacturing can, thus.
generate large taxable surPlus.

The results also show that lagged values of the share of agriculture are
inversely related to the tax ratio and significant al the 5Yo level. This supports
the findings by Stotsky and woldeMariam (1997) who maintained that
subsistence agriculture widely practised by developing countries doe-s not
generate taxable surplus, as small farmers are known to be notoriously diffrcult
io tax and these countries are also unwilling to tax the main foods used for

subsistence. The negative sign of the foreign debt ratio reflects the loss in debt
service of huge finincial reiources that could have aided the growth of vital
sectors of the economy to generate income.

on the other hand, the correct sign of the shadow variable confirms the

existence of a large informal sector that promotes the loss of tax revenue in
WAMZ countriesl The share of per capita income is the only variable that is
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wrongly signed, though significant in determining the tax ratio (see Appendix
I)' The negative sign is not surprising given the pittem of income distri'bution
in wAMZ countries where the concentration oi in.o-" is in the hands of a
privileged few who control state resources and are likely to prevent the
implementation of tax systems that adversely affect them. The above line
of
argnment concurs with the submission by Bird, yazquez and rorgler (2007)
who maintained that the main reason many developing countrieJdo not tui
themselves more may be that it is not in the interest of tliose who dominate
the
political institutions ofsuch countries to increase taxes. The ratio ofper capita
income does not, therefore, enter our computation ofthe tax effort indix.
The fixed-effects estimations for the income and profit tax ratio are presented
in equation (5). The detailed results are contained in Appendix II.
TY[':A,*

+

0.738Typ

G

t) + 0.3l7xMG+ 0.450MFG

- 0.83lFDG(_t)

(r0.22r) (1.9s6) (2.884) (-2.s4s)

_

0.603 FDc (-2)

_

(-1.894)

0.708SV (-2).....5
.

1-r.szil

R-squared : 0.932, D.W. : 2.035,S.E.R. : 0.201, F = 53.6, R_squaredAdj.
=
0.915,
.{* represents country intercepts, (t-statistics are reported in parentheses)
The results of the estimation for the ratio of income and profit taxes
are similar

to those of the total tax ratio except that the share of agriculture is not
significant in determining the variations in the income and print tax ratio.
Ii is
also not surprising that the share of agriculture is not signin"ant
sin.e waptZ
counfies rely on subsistence agriculture, not mec-haniz"a fu.o,irj ifrul

generates income. Subsistent farmers are known to produce
those thing"s

:_o1:*,
lncomes.

thet
with only an insignificant proportion thit is sold to meet?amity

The results for the ratio of international trade taxes are presented
in equation
(6) andAppendix III.

INT

:

Bi* + 0.260INT (- l) + 0.687XMG

_ I .01

TFDG (_2) _ 0.525AGG....... (6)
(_1.71e)

(2.27s) (3.e66) (_3.814)
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R-squared = 0.899, D.W. = 1.994, S.E.R.

:

0.231, F = 38.8, R-squared Adj. =

0.876,
B,* represents country intercepts, (t-statistics are reported in parentheses)

As in the previous cases, the share of per capita income is significant but
wrongly signed for reasons earlier explained. However, the shadow variable
and the share of manufacturing are not significant in explaining changes in the
ratio of intemational trade taxes. All the other variables remain significant and

correctly sigled. Again, it is not surprising that the shadow variable is not
significant in determining the ratio of international trade since trading
activities take place at specified locations, making it difficult to evade taxes.
More over, smuggling activities are increasingly being put under control in
WAMZ countries arising from the recent customs reforms, thus diminishing
the negative influence of the shadow variable on intemational trade taxes. As
expectid, the manufacturing sector is not significant in determining the foreign
trate ratio given that WAMZ countries depend on primary products for
exports, not manufactured goods.

the results of the estimation for the ratio of indirect taxes
indicate that all the variables, except the shadow variable, remained significant
in determining the ratio of indirect taxes. The pattem of relationship is also
maintained aJin the total tax ratio. The swnmary of the results for indirect
taxes is given in equation (7) below.
In Appendix

INDT= \+

+

IY

0.564INDT(-t)

+ 0.335XMG

(s.009)

+0.2?3MFG -0.608FDG(-l) -0 542AGG(-2) "

(2.663) (2.06t) (-2.968')

:

:

(-2.235)

"

'(7)

R-squared = 0.912, D.W. 1.919, S.E.R. = 0' 178, F 45.1, R-squared Adj'
0.891,
\* represents country intercepts, (t-statistics are reported in parentheses)

V.2

:

Country-SpecilicEffects

In Appendix Y all the country-specific dummy variables were found to be
statistically significant suggesting that factors specific to these countries such
as the quality of govemance, distribution of income, the potitical system,

"orn-odity

p.ice shocks, attitudes toward government, the tax administration,
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customs and other instifutions of govemment are important determinants
variations in the tax ratio.

of

Given the presenc-e of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of
both our fixed-effects and dummy variable specifications, ie attempted an
examination of the residuals for any evidence of higher-ordei serial
correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test-did not reject the
null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the risiduals up to ordir four.
Therefore, the estimated standard errors are valid and the estimated
coeflicients can be said to be unbiased and consistent.

V.3

Tax effort in Nigeria and OtherWAMZ Countries

The focus of this study is to appraise Nigeria's tax effort in comparison with
other countries of the westAfrican Moneiary Zone. The motivation was
bome
out ofthe need to investigate whether or not ihe possibility exists for Nigeria
to
increase her tax revenue beyond the present levil, in view ofthe persisGnce
of
large budget deficits in the fiscar operations of tir" gor.--ent. our interest
here is in identiffing the tax components that can oFer the right channels
for
raising tax revenue. This would require the computation of
effort indices,
and the fixed-effects estimations presented in equations (4) - (7)were
used to

ti

obtain the predicted tax ratios for the individual countries."ihe tax effort
indices computed from the actual to the potential tax ratios are presented
below
in Tables (2) - (5).
Country

Table 2. WAMZ Countries: Tax Effort Index (Total Taxes)
t9,4 1995 lgtx 1yn 1998 1999 2m 2(,l/1 2f,02 N3 2004 2005

Ave

Gambia

r.150

1.139

1.041

1.r35

1.2$

LM,'

1.158

0.824

1.082

1.051

1.033

1.014

1.073

Ghanr

1.605

1.067

1.107

1.032

1.M7

0.907

1.011

1.256

0.951

1.036

1.064

1.032

1.093

Guinea

t.toz

1.n'7

1.1 15

1.331

1.155

1.120

t.{t't4

1.338

1.124

1.211

1.213

1.361)

1.205

Nigeria

0.91t0

0.932

0.u05

0.lt-36

1.101

1.120

1.083

1.085

0.998

0.953

0.901

0.810

o.967

s/r.eonc

t.t 68

1.2"74

1.131

0.606

1.190

1.193

1.249

1.120

1.178

1.166

1.170

1.140

1.132

1.201

1.114

1.040

0.9119

1.139

1.O17

1.115

1.125

1.06u

1.083

't.0'76

1.O71

1.094

Sou r ce :

Au tho r' s Comp u t ation
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Table 2 above shows the tax effort indices for total taxes computed for the five
WAMZ countries. The results show that the WAMZ countries have an average
taxeffort index of l.094berween1994and2005. This implies that any country
with tax effort index less than 1.094 exploits its estimated tax potential below
the average. In other words, the level of taxation falls short of what may be
reasonably expected of it given the extent to which the average country uses its
tax potential. The possibiliry therefore, exists for such a country to increase her
tax ievenue via tax reforms in view of the gap existing between the actual and
potential tax.

Nigeria's tax effort index at 0.967 is tess than unity and falls well below that of
the-average country suggesting that tax increment is feasible as the country has
the poteniial to accommodate higher tax rates. The opposite holds for countries
like Guinea and Sierra-Leone with tax effort indices above unity and well
ahead of the average performance. Such countries with tax effort index in
excess of the average appear to be making use of their tax bases to improve
revenue and can be regarded as operating on the prohibitive region of the
Laffer cvrve,such that a tax rate cut would benefit these countries in an attempt
to?aise extra revenue (Gandhi, 1987). Countries with a tax effort index less
than the average can be said to be operating on the normal r ange of the Laffer
curve so that a tax rate increase would be more realistic in an attempt to boost
revenue (Teera, 2003).

identiS which taxes are better candidates forNigeria to raise more revenue,
a further probe was carried out by disaggregating the analysis through the
computation of separate tax effort indices for these countries under the
different tax components. Table 3 below presents the WAMZ countries' tax
effortwith respect to taxes on international trade and transactions.

To

92

Central Bank

of Nigeria

Ecoromir atd Finatcial Re aiey

Ifarch 2008

Table 3. WAMZ Countries: Tax Effort Index (Taxes on International
Trade and Transactions)

Co*,.y

19D4 1995 t996 1yn 1998 lggg 2m

m1 N2

ZfI,3 2{[4 Zx)S

Avr

Grmbia

0.9{Jr'i

1.129

l.l

l rl

1.N2

L098

0.97{l

1.0t8

0.194

1.013

0.911

0. It4-t

0. 994

0.999

Ghana

1.740

1.fi15

1.249

0.986

1.073

0.661

0.788

0.998

1.txll

o.912

0. 991

0.9 32

1.03,1

Guioca

0.ti39

0.862

0.fJ95

0.913

0.f147

0.880

2.3311

0.873

'l.048

1.028

024

1.161

1.060

Nigcna

1.274

r.115

o.649

0.706

0.993

1.681

().16tJ

0.804

0.862

1.444

I 164

r25

1.0,ll)

S/l-conc

1.013

L l,{3

1.046

0.342

0.953

0 88?

1.115

1.015

1.265

1.094

1.119

1.f'1i

1.006

1.155

1.051

0.991

0.790

0.99-3

1.019

1.216

0.897

1.05t)

1.102

1.030

1.039

1.02a

Source : Au thor' s Comput a tion

A cursory look at Table 3 above shows

a rather different picture with regards to
international trade taxes. Under this tax componeni, Nigeria i, ;ukin;

remarkable efforts such that her performance excieds the ave;age
tax

.ff.; i;

WAMZ countries. All the countries, except The Gambia, hive tax effort
indices.above unity. It is, therefore, not viable for Nigeria to increase
international trade taxes with the hope of making more revenue. The
same
applies to other wAMZ countries like Ghana and 6uinea whose
efforts under

this- tax component are above the average. Instead, a
tax cut on intemational
trade taxes would benefit such countriei in an attempt to raise
extra revenue.
The above findings provide ajustification in support ofth"."c"nt
uJoption
Common Extemal Tariffs among the WAMZ countries with th"
moderating tax rates wirl help improve future transactions. The i.p".itiu.
oi
this decision lies in the above empirical evidence that a tax
cut on international
trade
help improve revenue for majority of the membe, corntries
-will
including Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea.

#
h;;tir;;

Table 4 below also indicates that Nigeria is doing fairly weI in
the area of
indirect taxes. The country recorded the second-best performance behind
Sierra Leone. Its tax effort index is right above unity though it still
exploits her
tax potentials less than average. consequentry, opport,nities still exist
for

: Appraisiag Nigeria's Tax
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:ria to raise more revenue from indirect taxes given that the countly has the
ntial to do so. The same can be said ofall the other countries except Sierra
re.
Table 4. WAMZ Countries: Tax Effort Index (Indirect Taxes)

Coont

1994 lgg' 1996 lryl

y

1998 1999 Zm

2ffi1

24/.J2

2m3 ZXX Zx)5

Avc'

1.066

1.073

0.975

t.022

1.115

tt 92

t'

1.079

0.1i2

1.036

0.975

0.899

0 986

0.994

1..161

0.9i2

1.010

0.877

1.042

O.t-9

)-

0.894

1.149

0.891

1.Mt1

1.1'52

1 113

1.035

Guioca

l.{m3

1.164

0.941

1.160

1.{)58

0.973

0.793

1.162

0.981

0.969

0.993

1.155

1.O29

Nigeria

1.108

0.681

1.140

o.926

1.927

1.241

0.188

1.105

0.982

1.071

0.988

0.849

1.067

S/Ifone

1.165

1.198

1.601

0.?53

1.638

1.380

1 830

1.601

1..135

1.595

1.500

t.509

1.559

1.241

1.134

1.111

0.948

1.356

L064

1.077

1.158

t.t25

1.135

1.106

1.122

1.131

Gambia

Source: Author' s Computation

search reveals that Nigeria pools her lowest effort under direct
taxation. The results for the income and profit tax component yield not only the
least effort among the WAMZ countries but the index of tax effort shows a
furtherslide to 0.887 andwell belowthat ofthe average country (see Tabte 5)'

A further

Table 5. WAMZ Countries: Tax Effort Index (Taxes on Income and Profits)

countty lc)g4 1995 1996 lW

1998 1999 2m0 20f1 W02 2,0/J3 ?fi4 2,05 Ltc

Gamhia

1.215

0.956

0.914

1.06i1

1.204

0.850

1.178

0.824

0.9-+8

t.u)4

1.063

0.94{'

1.026

Ghaoa

1.151

0.973

0.916

1.191

0.863

0.871

0.912

1.123

a).935

1.083

1.068

l'qt2

1.008

Guinca

0.885

0.985

1.089

1.114

0.849

0.862

1.666

1.031

0.916

0.864

0.856

0.988

1.009

Nigcir

0.85(l

0.4't3

0.679

[.641

0.1162

0.93ri

1..199

1.0t 3

0.900

1.063

0.966

0.814

0.887

S/l-conc

0.919

|.02'7

1.089

0.642

0.839

0.988

1.O77

0.963

1.051

1.075

1.026

1.0r4

0.976

f.il04

0.871

o.949

0.930

o.923

0.902

1.266

0.991

0.95t)

1.036

0.996

0.955

0.98r
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This finding is consistent w ith apriori expectation and sheds more light on the
significance of the shadow variable for the income and profit tax comlonent as
depicted in Appendix II. The result suggests that more effort is still needed if
income and prof,rt tax evasion must be iffectively restrained in Nigeria. The
outcome further authenticates the concern raised in the literature on d"eveloping
countries with respect to the large pool ofactivities going on in these.ouri.i"f
without any form of documentation. The conseqrenci of this exit option
embraced by operators in the informal sector iends credence to earlier
afguments that personal income taxation in developing countr.ies are almost
exclusively applied to wage income in the formal sector, particurariy,
govemment employment. The same quandary characterizes p.opi.ty
irco-e
taxation in Nigeria with only partry sums collected uy tt it i.a ti.. oi
government.
"

VI.

Conclusion

This study adopted certain empiricar measurements in assessing tax efforts
across countries of the wAMZ in order to determine the possibility-or
otherwise
of raising tax revenue in Nigeria. The objective was to aicertain whether
or not
Nigeria is constrained in its revenue collections by low capacity to generate
revenue or by non-commitment towards using the available tax ."iu"itito
n na

public services. The outcome of our investigations gave useful iniications
about the nature ofthe relationships between tix ratios-and a set oferplanutory
factors believed to influence the tai ratios.
some ofthe estimated coefficients conform to apriori expectations wh
e others
do not and we attempted to offer explanations about thei*on-.orro.*ity
*itt
the expectations
theory. we, therefore, wish to draw caution in interpretinl
-of
certain aspects ofthe
results and theirpolicy implications as the model dLes noi
fUlV.a9cor11t f9r the country-specific factors as captured by the."f""unt
O"-.y
variables. The dummy variable estimation does not enter our computation
of ta;

effort indices but is merely used to emphasize the existence of certain
qualitative country-specific factors that haveiignificant effects on the
tax ratio.
The results of the fixed-effects estimations were used to compute indices
of tax
efforts for these countries for purposes of comparison and to Le able to responJ
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to the important question on the possibility or otherwise of raising tax revenues

ascertaining the feasibility of increasing tax revenues, we
disaggregated our analysis to enable us identiff the sources oflow and high tax
efforts.

in Nigeria. On

Empirical evidence revealed that Nigeria's index of tax effort for total taxes and
tu*.. on income and profits are below unity while the index of indirect taxes is
above unity but falls short of the average performance in the wAMZ. However,
the country is recording an impressive performance under international trade
taxes as its index oftax iffort is not only above average but second to best in the
WAMZ. These measures of tax effort have relevant implications for fiscal
policy in the event of a budgetary imbalance. At0.967,the overall index of tax
fo. Nigeria is well below the average performance of 1 '094' By
"ffort
implication, Nigeria has exploited her estimated tax potential below average
and, thus, the possibility exists for her to increase tax revenue' Nigeria is,
therefore, not limited in its revenue collections by a low capacity to generate
revenue and could choose to raise extra tax revenues rather than rationing
expenditures when key sectors ofthe economy are begging for more attention.
The appropriate channel is for the country to increase her tax effort towards
ir.o-" tui., given the low index of tax performance the country is making in
this area. Theioncentration ofthe tax burden on the formal sector employees
with little attention paid to the self-employed does not speak well for a country
yeaming to develop. Assets including incom_es.of the rich and wealthy which to
"extent
reflict rents secured via political connections or monopolies
a gfeat
shiuld, based on the principle ofequity and fairness, be subjected to appropriate
taxation. Possibilities also exist ior tax increases under indirect taxation in
Nigeria. In view of the above, it may be advisable for the country to develop_a
It
nafronal tax policy that articulates clear strategies for dealing with tax leakage'
.uy ut.o be desirable for the country to implement aspects of the proposed
amlndments to the recent tax policy reforms, particularly, the provision of a tax
rate for the taxation of companies engaged in downstream gas operations and
Tax
the ability to tax profits of iuch companies under the Companies Income
ect 1Ctfi). fhe country may also undertake more tax reforms by exploring- the
ideniified potentials in ihe informal sector and broaden the revenue base ofthe
economy.
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Appendix I
Fixed Effects Estimation for Total Tax Ratio
Dependent Variable: LTXG?

Method: Pooled l-east Squares

Dzte 06/O3/07 Tirnc: 16:21
Sample (adiusted): 1994

2OO5

Iocluded observations: 12 after adiustrnents
Cross-sections includcd: 5
Total pool Galanced) obseri'ations: 60
Variat'le
C

CoefEcient

Std. L,rror

t Sratistic

Prob.

4.710713

7.256564

3.7 4aA71

0.ooo5
o.0000

LTXG?(-1)

o.6429a1

o.o72270

8.896900

I-xMG?
LMFG?

o.344267

o.111150

3.O97

307

o.oo33

o.274567

o.119791.

2.292052

o.0263

r-AGG?(-1)

-o.4780a1

o.203966

2.343922

o.0233

LFDG?(-2)

-o_806770

o.157586

-5.119546

o_oooo

L\-P?(-1)

-0.888730

o.240634

-3.69322',1

0.ooo6

rsv?(-2)

-o.464276

o.136816

Fi-Yed

3.39343a

o.0014

Effects (Cross)

-GAM--C
_GI IA.-C
-GUI--C
_NIG-.C
-SIE.-C

-o.o75397

-o.213210
o.352091

-o.657344
o.533858

F,ffects Speci6cation
Cross section fixed (<turnrny variables)
R-squated

o.910285

Mean dependent var

-1.969456

Adjusted R-squatcd

o.889725

S.D. dependent vat

o.434910

of regression

o.144423

Akaikc info criterion

-o.a55279

Surn squarcd resid

1.OO1189

Schvarz criterion

o.436410

I-og likelihood

37.65A37

F-statistic

44.27527

Durbin-'$?'atson stat

2.O93434

Prob€-statistic)

0.oooooo

S.F..
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Appendix II
Fixed-Effects Estimation for Income and profit Tax Ratio
Dcpendcnt Variable: LT\-P?
Method: Pooled I-€ast Squa.res
Datc: 06/02/0? Tirne: 22:34
Sarnple (adiusted): 7994 21os

Includcd obscrvations: 12 after adlustmcnts
Cross-scctions inciuded: 5
Total pool @alanced) observations: 60
CoeF6cicnt

Ertor

t-Statistic

7.901336

1.927090

4.',too139

o.oo02

629

o.o72165

1/J.2214't

0.oooo

I-:(MG?

o.317052

o.161919

1.95a088

o.o562

LMFG?
LFDG?(-2)

o.449999

o.156035

2.aa3964

o.oo59

-o.603296

o..31a455

-1.894447

0.o64-3

Lr--DG?(-1)

-0.83087s

o.2e1a54

-2.947A92

o.oo50

LYP?(_1)

-1.392590

o.37074"1

-3.7 56234

o.ooo5

rJv?(_2)
LA(;c;?(_2)
Fixed Effects (Cross)

-o.7()8367

o.798752

3.574A73

0.(Doa

o.465377

o.340{154

1.365324

t).1187

C

LTYP?(-1)

-GAM-.C
.GHA-.C
_GUI..C
_NIG.-C
-SIE--C

o.7 37

Std.

0.o53093
-o.345869

o.431663
-o.736765
o.597879

Efccts Speci6cation
Cross-scction 6xcd (du'nrny variabtcs)

R squared

o.931913

-\diustcd R-squarcd

o.914529

Meao dependent var
S.D. depcodent var

o.641a32

o.20't090

Akaike info criterion

-0-180990

Sum squared tesid

1.9o.J552

Schwatz criterion

I-g lik€Iihood
Durt in-\vatso'l stat

o.272785

1a.42970

F-statistic

53.607A7

2.O35411

Problr*-statistic)

0-000000

S.E.

of regression

3.350998
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APPendix III
Fixed-Effects Estimation for Ratio of International Trade Taxes
Dependent Variable: LINT?

Method: Pooled
Date:

I-rcast Squarcs

06/o3/o7 Timc:

15:43

Sampte (adiusted): 1994 2OO5

Included observations: 12 aftet adiustments
Cross-sections includcd: 5

Total pool @ataoced) observations:

(r0

(ltrcfficient

Std. F,tror

t-Statistic

Prob.

3.895830

1.944921

1.998968

0.0513

LINT?(-1)

o-260235

o.114391

2.274953

o.o274

LXMG?

o.686942

0.173221

3.96s920

0.0002

LFDG?(-2)

-1.01673s

o.266592

-3.A13A22

0.0004

LYP?(-1)

-o.910152

o372AO2

-2.441379

0.0184

-1.718800

o.0921

Variablc
C

I.AGG?

-0.525330

0.305638

IJ\,TFG?

o351a27

0.231098

1.522414

o.1345

o.148329

o.262077

0.565976

0.5740

I-SV?

Fixcd Effccts (Cross)

-GAM--C
-GHA..C
-GUI.-C
-NIG--C
_SIE--C

0.457385
-o.5'19493
-0.076513
-o-956195
1.095416

Effects Speciiicatioo
Cross-section fixcd (dummy vadables)

0.875768

Mean dcpendeot var
S.D dcpendcnt var

o.231262

Akaike info criterion

o.oa6326

2.561142

Schli/alz criterion

0.505195

Log likelihood

9.410231

F-sratistic

38.81081

Durbio-Watson stat

1.993983

Ptob@- statistic)

o.u)oofi)

R-squated
Adiustcd R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum s<luarcd resid

0.898930

-3.0O9867

o.656127
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Appendix IV
;timation for Ratio of Indirect Taxes

Depend enr Variable: LINDT?

Mcfiod: Poolcd

I-cast Squarcs

D^te: 06/O3/O7 Time: 14:56
Samplc (adiustcd): 1994 2oo5

Included ot scnations: 12 aftcr adjustments
Cross-scctions included: 5
Ti>tal pool @alanced) obscrvations: 6()

variabtc

Cocf6cicnt

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

1.77a728

2.2143a1

0.o316

C

3.938781

r.rNDT?(_1)

o.563964

0.112589

5.009050

o.0000

IXNTG?

o.33475A

o.125451

2.66a442

0.0104

LMFG?

0.273249

o.132561

2.061306

o.0447

r_FDG?(_1)

-o.60?a33

o.20477 3

-2.96A333

o.oo47

L1'P?(_ 1)

-o.811357

o.33s633

-2.417393

0.o195

r-AGG?(-2)

-o.541510

o.242312

-2.234764

0.o301

LSV?

-o.193027

o.193264

-o.99a77a

o.3229

Fixcd tjffccts (Ctoss)

-GAM-.C
-GHA--C
-GUI.-C
-NIG.-C
_SIE--C

0.042850
-0.131903
o.341924
-o_766624
0.5137 54

Effccts Speci6cation
Cross-scction

fi

xed (dummy veriabtes)

R-squared

o.911724

l\{can depcndcot var

Adiuste<l R-squatcd

o.491494

S.D. depcndent vai

of regression

o.117A10

Akaike info ctiterion

-o.439345

Sum squatcd rcsid

r.517588

Schu/arz criterion

-o.020476

I-og likelihood

25.r 8035

F-statistic

45.06810

Dufbin-Watson stat

1.919136

Prob(F- statistic)

o.000000

S.E.

-2.340517
o.539796
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APPendix V
Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimation
Dependcnt Variable: LTXG?
Method: Pooled I-east Squares
Date: 06/O3/O7 Tirnc: 17:16
Sarnple (adiusted): 1994 2OO5
Included observatioos: 12 after adiustments
Cross-sections included: 5
Totat pool @alanced) observations: 60

CocfEcieot
GM?

5.353746

Error

t-St:rtistic

Prob.

1.495898

3.578950

0.0o08

3.484689

0.0011

Std.

GH?

5.1667 49

1.482700

GU?

5.660230

1.559230

3-630144

0.0007

NG?

4.193631

1.429144

3.354198

0.0016

SI?

5.79A47 3

1.472567

4.104919

0.0002

r-TxG?(-1)

0.705067

0.076090

9.266250

0.0000

2-174372

0.0346

I)(MG?

o.241774

o.111194

LMFG?
LAGG?(,2)
LFDG?(-1)

0.345073

o.10a744

3.113257

0.0026

-0.s97056

O.21256tt

-2.808880

o.oo72

-o.682112

0.179781

-3,193993

0.0004

r.YP?(-1)

-o.970993

0.280508

-0.345052

-3.461554
-2.333929

0.0011

o.147842

I-Sv?(-2)

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var

-1.969456

0.153438

Akaike info criterion

-o;/34142

1.130071

Schwatz ctiterion

-0.315313

34.02546

Durbin-Whtson stat

R squared

o.89A736

Adiusted R-squared
S.E. of tegtession

o.a1 5529

Sum squared tesid

likelihood

0.0238

o.434910

2.O2A130

